Chapter 1 from my latest book "Natural Structure of the World Community of the Future"
New definition of the common good
On the website of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, we read the following description of the common good: "That which benefits many people is called the "common good". The laws of the state, for example, should serve the common good and ensure peaceful coexistence. The opposite of the common good is catering to the wishes of individual people or groups. There is often a debate in politics and society about what exactly benefits everyone. ... Sometimes there is a conflict between the interests of individual people and the interests of the common good. Then the courts decide."
Many scientists are giving serious thought to how we can better safeguard the common good in the future, not just of one nation but of the entire global community. Moral philosopher Michael J. Sandel even fears the end of the common good if populists are on the rise worldwide. In his latest book ("Vom Ende des Gemeinwohls; Wie die Leistungsgesellschaft unsere Demokratien zerreißt"; German edition by S. Fischer, October 2022), he describes how and why we should oppose the tyranny of performance. He also suggests that to this end, we must also rethink the concept of the common good. To do this, we need to overcome the tendency of extreme individualisation in our society, which is fatal to any democracy, by strengthening and re-emphasising our moral bonds with others. To deepen these thoughts, I quote several fragments directly from Sandel's book in this chapter.
The content of this valuable book, captured in one sentence, sounds like this (p. 27):
"To be able to find a way out of the polarised politics of our day, we need a reckoning with merit and achievement."
And the approach to a solution to the problem, also in one sentence, could read (p. 28):
"We need to clarify whether the solution to our disjointed politics is to live even more confidently according to the merit principle, or whether we should look for a common good beyond selection and competition."
And a somewhat broader explanation of what the author is talking about (p. 30):
"The harsh reality is that Trump was elected because he tapped into the wellspring of fears, frustrations and legitimate grievances for which the established parties had no convincing answers. A similar plight is afflicting European democracies. Before they can hope to win back public support, these parties need to rethink their mission and purpose. To do so, they should learn from the populist protests that have displaced them - not by emulating their xenophobia and strident nationalism, but by taking seriously the legitimate grievances with which these ugly sentiments are intertwined.
Such thinking should begin with the realisation that these grievances are not just economic, but also moral and cultural; they are not just about wages and jobs, but also about social esteem."
The most important keywords for the causes of this situation, which the author calls "a political failure of historic proportions", are the following (p. 33):
"At the heart of this failure is the approach by which the established parties have designed and executed the project of globalisation over the past four decades. Two aspects of this project have created the conditions that keep populist protest going. One is the technocratic way of framing the common good, the other is the meritocratic way of defining winners and losers."
The historical background to this unfortunate change can be read on page 34:
"This change had begun in the 1980s. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher believed that the state was the problem and the markets were the solution. When they left the political stage, it was the centre-left politicians who followed them - Bill Clinton in the US, Tony Blair in the UK and Gerhard Schröder in Germany - who softened but also consolidated the belief in the market. They smoothed the rough edges of unleashed markets, but left the central premise of the Reagan/Thatcher era - that market mechanisms are the primary tool for realising the common good - untouched. In line with this conviction, they embraced a market-driven version of globalisation and welcomed the increasing capture of the economy by financial market capitalism."
What now? Michael Sandel's initial proposal for a solution goes like this (p. 52):
"To restore democracy, we need to find a path to a more morally robust public discourse - one that takes seriously the corrosive effects of meritocratic competition on the social bonds that make up our communal life."
To understand this proposal a little more broadly, we continue reading on page 361 of his book:
"If democracy is no more than an economy by other means, if it is only about adding up our individual interests and preferences, then its fate does not depend on the moral bonds of its citizens. A consumerist conception of democracy can fulfil its limited role whether we share a vibrant communal life or inhabit privatised enclaves with people of our own ilk.
But if the common good can only be achieved if we think together with our fellow citizens about the purposes and goals worthy of our political community, then democracy cannot be indifferent to the character of community life. This does not require perfect equality. What is necessary, however, is for citizens from different walks of life to come together in common spaces and public places. This is how we learn to negotiate and put up with our differences. And this is how we manage to look after the common good."
A few pages earlier (p. 356), Michael Sandel describes the danger of today's extreme individualism even more clearly:
"Being oriented only or primarily toward (social) advancement does little to nurture the social bonds and civic connectedness that a democracy requires. Even a society that is more successful at upward mobility than ours should also allow those who do not move up to thrive in place and feel like members of a community project."
How could it be that we have seemingly given up on the common good? He explains (on p. 315):
"Yet the idea that the money we earn reflects the value of our contribution to society has become deeply ingrained in recent decades. It resonates throughout public culture.
Meritocratic selection has helped to solidify this idea. This is also true of the neoliberal or market-oriented version of globalisation that has been adopted by the established centre-right and centre-left parties since the 1980s. Even as globalisation created enormous inequality, these two views - the meritocratic and the neoliberal - limited the grounds for opposing it. They also undermined the dignity of labour and fuelled resentment against elites as well as the corresponding political backlash."
And further (on p. 325):
"Any serious response to working-class frustration must combat the elitist condescension and exam-believing prejudices that have matured in the cultural public sphere. It must also put the dignity of labour at the centre of the political agenda. ... the way in which a society recognises and rewards work is crucial to how it defines the common good."
However, he also describes a possible way out of this miserable situation (on p. 330):
"For the comprehensive anger in the country is at least partly a crisis of recognition. And our contribution to the common good, for which we receive recognition, is made in our role as producers and not as consumers.
...
This cannot be achieved through economic activities alone. It is more important to negotiate with our fellow citizens about how to achieve a good and just society - one that cultivates civic virtues and empowers everyone to think together about worthwhile goals for our political community."
And further (on p. 332):
"The civic conception of the common good thus requires a certain kind of politics, one that provides opportunities for public discussion. But it also suggests a certain way of thinking about work. From the perspective of the civic imagination, our most important role in the economy is not that of the consumer, but that of the producer. As such, we develop and practise our skills; we provide goods and services to meet the needs of our fellow citizens and receive social recognition in return. The true value of our contribution cannot be measured by the wages we receive, because wages are ... dependent on the randomness of supply and demand. Rather, the value of our contribution depends on the moral and civic significance of the goals our endeavours serve. This includes an independent moral judgement, which the labour market, however efficient, cannot provide."
To reinforce his thoughts, Sandel even quotes from a pastoral letter from the US National Conference of Catholic Bishops (p.334):
"All people 'have an obligation to be active and productive participants in social life,' and the state has 'a duty to organise economic and social institutions so that people can contribute to society in a way that respects their freedom and dignity of labour.' "
Finally, the crucial question (p. 338):
"Now the question is what an alternative political project might look like."
The last chapter of Sandel's book is subtitled "Recognising Work". I quote the last sentences of this chapter here because they are very important for our further discussion about the necessary renewal of our democracy (pp. 352-353):
"The debate about who is a maker and who is a taker in today's economy ultimately boils down to a debate about fairness of contribution - about which economic roles should be valued and recognised. A thorough discussion of this question requires a public debate about what should be considered a valuable contribution to the common good. ... But my main point is that the dignity of labour can only be renewed if we debate the moral issues that underlie our economic order - issues that have been obscured by the technocratic policies of recent decades.
One of these questions relates to what kinds of labour are worthy of recognition and appreciation. Another concerns what we owe each other as citizens. These questions are related. For we cannot determine what counts as a valuable contribution without thinking together about the goals and purposes of our community life. And we cannot think about common goals and purposes without a sense of belonging, a sense of obligation to one another as members of a community. Only to the extent that we depend on others and recognise our dependence do we really have a reason to value their contribution to our collective well-being. This requires a sufficiently strong sense of community for citizens to say and believe that 'we are all in the same boat' - not as a ritual incantation in times of crisis, but as a comprehensible reflection of our everyday lives.
Over the past four decades, market-driven globalisation and the meritocratic notion of success have dissolved these moral bonds. Global supply chains, capital flows and the cosmopolitan identities they favour have made us less dependent on our fellow citizens, less grateful for the work they do and less open to the demands of solidarity. Meritocratic selection has taught us that our success is based on our own performance, corroding our sense of obligation. We now find ourselves in the midst of the ferocious whirlwind that this disintegration has created. To restore the dignity of labour, we must repair the social bonds that the age of meritocracy has destroyed."
As you will have noticed, I have emphasised several thoughts from the Sandels book in italics. Let's present them together again so that we can remember them better as we continue reading my book.
"Two aspects of this project created the conditions that keep the populist protest going. One is the technocratic way of framing the common good, the other is the meritocratic way of defining winners and losers."
"To reinvigorate democracy, we need to find a path to a more morally robust public discourse - one that takes seriously the corrosive effects of meritocratic competition on the social bonds that make up our communal life."
"This does not require perfect equality. What is necessary, however, is for citizens from different walks of life to come together in shared spaces and public places. This is how we learn to negotiate and put up with our differences. And that's how we manage to look after the common good."
"... it's not just about wages and jobs, but also about social esteem."
"... the way in which a society recognises and rewards work is crucial to how it defines the common good."
"The civil society concept of the common good therefore requires a certain type of policy, one that provides opportunities for public discussion."
"Because we cannot define what counts as a valuable contribution without thinking together about the goals and purposes of our community life. And we can't think about common goals and purposes without a sense of belonging, a sense of obligation to each other as members of a community."
It is precisely this lost sense of togetherness that I am concerned with in the other chapters of this book. Of course, this also includes a policy that must provide the conditions for public discussion. But above all, a policy that also makes it possible for citizens from different communities, families, extended families, municipalities and all even larger districts to meet in public places in groups that are common but always manageable in order to look after the common good. To do this, we have to start from scratch. We need to create new homes for such cohesive groups of people. To do this, we need new urban infrastructure and new social facilities for all communal groups of people.
In chapters 3 and 4, I outline my vision of our global community in the near future (a few decades from now) and how this could be realised in practice. But before that, in chapter 2, I make a direct appeal to our young people. Without their participation, we cannot hope for a peaceful future as one world community.
